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Article 3

Virelli: Transparency and Policymaking

TRANSPARENCY AND POLICYMAKING AT THE
SUPREME COURT
Louis J. Virelli III*
INTRODUCTION
I would like to thank the Georgia State University Law Review for
including me in this symposium on transparency at the Supreme
Court and for providing me the opportunity to respond to Professor
Eric Segall’s characteristically insightful and thought-provoking
article on the topic. I share many of Professor Segall’s concerns
about the transparency of our public institutions, including the Court.
I also agree that some of the Court’s practices, particularly with
regard to the Justices’ papers and cameras in the courtroom, could
benefit from greater transparency in light of the Court’s role in our
constitutional democracy.
I begin to depart from Professor Segall’s position, however, when
it comes to the Court’s certiorari and recusal practices. This is not
because I think transparency is necessarily a bad idea in either
context, but rather because I think the Court’s duties in each of these
areas go beyond its traditional judicial role into what I will
(somewhat clumsily) call policymaking responsibilities. The process
of policymaking, at least as I intend to use the term, involves
discretionary value judgments that are not typically seen as a core
feature of judging. Judges are fundamentally expected to be neutral
arbiters of legal disputes; they apply the facts of individual cases to
legal rules to arrive at legal conclusions.1 Of course, even core
judicial processes involve normative questions and judgments. This
is especially true with regard to the Supreme Court, which is not only
*
Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. In addition to thanking the Law Review for
including me in their symposium on transparency at the Supreme Court, I want to especially thank Luke
Donohue and Christine Lee for their excellent work in making the symposium, and this issue, possible.
1. In fact, this assumption lies at the heart of most conversations about judicial recusal, including
recusal at the Supreme Court. Professor Segall cites the prospect of someone being a judge in his or her
own case as support for the need for judicial recusal and, in turn, for transparency in the recusal process.
See Eric J. Segall, Invisible Justices: How Our Highest Court Hides from the American People, 32 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 787, 797–810 (2016).
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our court of last resort, but also the institution that is tasked with
answering some of our most divisive and complex national questions.
Nevertheless, I contend that there is a difference between the
Supreme Court’s typical judicial role, represented in its resolution of
cases through the public issuance of legally binding judgments and
opinions, and the far less common, but very real, exercises of
discretionary authority it is required to make as part of its broader
institutional mission. Those discretionary decisions incorporate more
open-ended considerations of the Court’s role in our tripartite
government. Such considerations include the public welfare and
opinion that are neither as universally accepted in, nor as closely
constrained by positive law, as traditional judging. In short, the
Justices sometimes must exercise, in the words of Chief Justice John
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, a form of “constitutional or legal
discretion” that likens them more to the political branches than the
courts.2
But where does this discretionary authority come from? Since we
do not normally think of judges as explicitly making policy, it makes
sense to first ask whether the Court is in fact permitted to exercise
discretion in its certiorari and recusal decisions, and second, whether
broad discretion is justified in each of those areas. I suggest that the
answer to both of these is an unqualified yes, albeit for slightly
different reasons. The Justices’ discretionary power over its certiorari
decisions has been delegated by Congress, and as such is justified by
its legislative pedigree.3 Discretion over recusal decisions is, I argue
both here and elsewhere, committed exclusively to the Justices by the
text, history, and structure of the Constitution—more specifically by
Article III’s vesting of the “judicial Power of the United States”
exclusively in the courts.4 That is not to say that either decision is
wholly unbounded. Congress could exercise its power over the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction to more closely control its docket, and
there are constitutional limits—like the Due Process Clause—on the
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 (2012).
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; See also LOUIS J. VIRELLI III, DISQUALIFYING THE HIGH COURT:
SUPREME COURT RECUSAL AND THE CONSTITUTION 46-94 (Forthcoming 2016).
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Justices’ recusal practices.5 These limits only highlight the fact,
however, that there is a range of choices in each context that is not
just left to the Court’s discretion, but that is committed to its
discretion as a matter of law.
So what does the fact that the Court is sometimes asked to make
discretionary “policy” judgments have to do with transparency? The
answer may ultimately be nothing—it is entirely possible that
transparency is equally well-justified in every aspect of the Court’s
existence. The Court is, after all, a public institution entrusted with
vast power and responsibility. It seems potentially inconsistent with
the concept of democratic government to have important decisions
made in relative secret, with little or no accountability. This is all
true. It does not, however, account for the fact that many of our
governmental institutions often make—or at least contemplate—
important policy decisions in secret. Congress, our primary
policymaking institution, is constitutionally required to “keep [and
publish] a [j]ournal of its [p]roceedings,” but only to the extent the
Congress determines that the proceedings do not “require [s]ecrecy.”6
Even a roll call vote is only constitutionally required to be reported
when “one fifth of those [p]resent” desire it.7 Executive officials,
including administrative agencies that have been delegated express
policymaking authority by Congress, have long been protected from
disclosing their deliberations over certain policy questions to the
public, even in the face of formal requests for that information.8 The
most common rationale given for executive secrecy is the need to
protect agency deliberations in order to “encourage open, frank
discussions on matters of policy” and to “protect against premature
disclosure of proposed policies . . . and . . . public confusion that

5. VIRELLI , supra note 4, at 120–64.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
7. Id.
8. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2012). The primary legal vehicle for public disclosure of government
materials, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), contains an exception for materials that would be
considered privileged in the context of civil litigation, including the deliberative process privilege. Id.;
United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 800 (1984); Burka v. HHS, 87 F.3d 508, 516 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (explaining that FOIA “incorporates . . . generally recognized civil discovery protections”).
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might result from disclosure of reasons and rationales that were not
in fact ultimately the grounds for an agency’s action.”9
The question, then, is whether the same rationales that permit
secrecy in the legislative and executive branches’ policymaking
processes apply to the members of the judiciary when they too are
tasked with making policy decisions. The Justices make such
determinations when they decide whether to grant certiorari or to
recuse themselves from cases properly before the Court. The
remainder of this essay will explore how the discretionary nature of
certiorari and recusal decisions impact the arguments for
transparency in both contexts.
I. CERTIORARI
The Supreme Court currently enjoys virtually unlimited discretion
over its own appellate docket.10 It exercises this discretion through its
decisions to grant or deny petitions for writs of certiorari.11 Congress
first granted the Court the power to refuse cases on appeal at the end
of the nineteenth century.12 By that point, the Court had fallen several
years behind on its existing docket. It implored Congress to provide
some relief by authorizing the Justices to reject cases that it did not
think merited their attention.13 Congress obliged, but the problem of
9. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, EXEMPTION 5, at 13
(2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/exemption5.pdf [hereinafter
DOJ GUIDE].
10. The Court has less discretion over whether to exercise its original jurisdiction over cases
“affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a
Party.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. See also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972)
(explaining that the Court’s original jurisdiction should be invoked “sparingly,” but that it nonetheless is
“obligatory . . . in appropriate cases” (quoting Utah v. United States, 394 U.S. 89, 95 (1969))).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012). Direct appeal to the Supreme Court is available from decisions in civil
cases by three-judge district courts. Id.
12. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential
Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 392 (2004) (noting that the
“Court found itself unable to cope with its workload and fell more than three years behind in processing
cases.”).
13. This decision was made easier by Congress’s creation of the lower federal appellate courts
around the same time, thereby offering litigants a more robust opportunity to appeal federal trial court
decisions without infringing on the resources of the Supreme Court or its justices. Establishment of the
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 26 Stat. 826 (1891), http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark
_12_txt.html. Prior to that time, the federal appeals were still being heard by panels of judges consisting
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an overloaded docket persisted.14 Congress responded with the
Judiciary Act of 1925, which conferred on the Justices “broad
discretion to decline to review the vast majority of the cases”
presented to it.15 The 1925 Act did not, however, eliminate all forms
of mandatory appellate review for the Court,16 and the Justices
continued to push back against those mandatory appeals. The Court
often treated mandatory appellate cases in the same summary fashion
as petitions for certiorari. The result was the erosion of the
“discretionary-mandatory distinction between certiorari and appeal”
and a further practical expansion of the Court’s control over its
docket.17 This combination of judicial pressure and practical effect
led Congress to effectively remove all statutory impediments to the
Court’s discretionary authority over its appellate docket in 1988.18
Since that time, the Court has exercised nearly unfettered control
over its caseload, especially its appellate cases.
Congress has never required the Justices to explain their decisions
or even to set standards to guide those decisions. The Justices have
articulated their own set of considerations for granting certiorari, but
have also made clear that those considerations are “neither
controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion.”19 The Court
of local federal trial court judges and Supreme Court justices “riding circuit”—travelling around the
country to sit as judges in federal appeals. See Judiciary Act of 1802, 2 Stat. 156 (1802),
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_04_txt.html.
14. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 12, at 392 (explaining that Congress responded to the Court’s
overtures with the Evarts Act, “which created the intermediate courts of appeals and for the first time
explicitly conferred on the Supreme Court some authority—through an order denying a writ of
certiorari—simply to turn away cases that were not judged to warrant full consideration and resolution
on their merits”).
15. Id.
16. The Act still required the Court to hear appeals in a subset of cases, including cases in which a
state supreme court declared a federal statute unconstitutional or denied a constitutional challenge to a
state statute. The 1925 Act also required the Court to decide cases that were certified to them by federal
appellate courts. See Section 240(a) of the Judiciary Act of 1925, http://www.fjc.gov/history/
home.nsf/page/landmark_15_txt.html; History of the Federal Judiciary: Landmark Judicial Legislation,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_15.html (last visited
June 2, 2016).
17. Federal Judicial Center, Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57
F.R.D. 573, 595–96 (1972).
18. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 12, at 394 (citing Review of Cases by the Supreme Court, Pub.
L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988)).
19. SUP. CT. R. 10.
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is thus left, as a matter of law and practice, with the authority to
decide for itself if a case merits review.
This fact alone, however, does not say much about whether the
Justices should have to take the next step of justifying why they
exercised their discretion in a particular way. It is one thing to grant a
government decision maker wide latitude in reaching its conclusion.
It is quite another to allow them to do so without any public
explanation. The latter point requires some additional understanding
of why judicial discretion is important in the certiorari context.
The predominant reason for granting the Court so much control
over its docket was concern about its caseload. Prior to the Act of
1925, the Court was as much as three years behind in its disposition
of cases. In a world where cases routinely take years just to get to the
certiorari stage, it is at least fair to acknowledge that an additional
three years of waiting for a decision from the Justices would be
problematic for the Court’s reputation and effectiveness. This is
particularly important because the Court’s democratic legitimacy—
its ability to garner public acceptance of its decisions—depends so
heavily on public perception.20 Once we recognize that the size of the
Court’s docket is a significant factor in its ability to fulfill its
constitutional responsibilities, we can see why broad discretion over
which cases it hears—and whether it should explain its exercise of
that discretion—is so important.
Assume that the maximum number of cases the Court can
competently hear and decide in a given term is 150.21 Now assume
that there are 200 cases in a given term that present important issues
of federal law to the Court. These cases may be “circuit splits,” in
which different federal circuits have reached opposite conclusions on
20. As Alexander Hamilton explained, the Court is the weakest branch of government because it
possesses “neither force nor will but merely judgment.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
It therefore depends on its ability to persuade for its authority. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865–66 (1992) (“[T]he Court’s legitimacy depends on making
legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently
plausible to be accepted by the Nation.”).
21. This is a conservative estimate. The Court’s current docket is roughly half that amount.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (May 29, 2016),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx#faqgi9.
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the same matter of federal law, cases in which a lower court
invalidated a federal statute on constitutional grounds, or cases that
directly conflict with controlling Court precedent. By the Justices’
own admission, each of these categories of cases is, at least
theoretically, worthy of Supreme Court review.22 Yet for solely
administrative reasons, one-fourth (50) of them must either be denied
certiorari or held over for decision in another term, thereby pushing
back worthy cases from the next term in a potentially endless cycle of
docket congestion and delay. If there is some quantitative limit on the
Court’s capacity to accept cases—and under the constitutional
requirement of a single, undivided Court there most certainly is23—
then the Justices will likely be forced to turn away cases that would
otherwise, time and resources permitting, merit its consideration. Put
another way, it is easy to imagine an environment where the Court’s
actual decisions to grant some cases and deny others is at best a
matter of taste and at worst arbitrary. Regardless of who is
responsible for the line drawing between worthy cases, a requirement
that the decision makers (in this case, the Justices) try to explain such
decisions in a way that provides the public with understandable and
useful insight into the working of government seems like a noble, but
ultimately doomed, exercise.
It of course would not be impossible for the Court to simply
explain that administrative limitations forced it to make exceedingly
difficult choices, but it is hard to imagine the benefit of such an
explanation outweighing its potential costs. For example, we
generally expect our public figures, especially our judges, to be
consistent in their decision making—to treat like cases alike. But the
quantitative limitations on certiorari decisions make that consistency
22. See SUP. CT. R. 10.
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Article III explicitly requires that there be “one supreme Court.” Id.;
The overwhelming consensus in the scholarly literature and in constitutional practice is that the Court
must act as a single unitary body, rather than, for instance, in smaller panels of justices. See, e.g., Louis
J. Virelli III, The (Un)Constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1181,
1220–22 (2011) [hereinafter Virelli, The (Un)Constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards].
But see Lisa T. McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, Coming Off the Bench: Legal and Policy Implications of
Proposals to Allow Retired Justices to Sit by Designation on the Supreme Court, 61 DUKE L.J. 81, 99–
100 (2011).
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near impossible. A case that may be granted review in one year may
simply not be able to be fit into the Court’s schedule the next. It is
easy to envision public sentiment turning against the Court when it
rejects an important case due primarily to concerns about docket
congestion. This is particularly true because the Court makes
certiorari decisions on a case-by-case basis. Even the most rational of
observers may struggle to accept the immediate loss of their own
preferred case for administrative reasons in favor of one they find
less worthy of review. Broader public sentiment is also more likely to
be moved by immediacy concerns than by the deferred gratification
of a timely and efficient justice system. As Justice Brennan explained
in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, there is an
inherent danger in “pit[ting] an interest the benefits of which are
immediate, concrete, and easily understood against one, the benefits
of which are almost entirely prophylactic.”24 The additional tension
around the Court resulting from the administrative rejection of
important cases could chip away at the public’s confidence in the
institution in a way that is potentially delegitimizing.
Moreover, different Justices may perceive the Court’s
administrative capacity and the relative value of cases or legal
doctrines differently. This creates two related, but ultimately distinct,
problems. First, in cases where administrative concerns are not
unanimous, certiorari decisions could be (rightly or not) perceived as
substantive judgments about the significance of particular cases.
Regardless of whether the Justices’ decisions are purely
administrative, the reality of administrative constraints on the Court
makes it exceedingly difficult (if not impossible) to separate the
substantive from the procedural. This is especially true when
certiorari decisions are split among the Justices. One response to this
could be that requiring every Justice to explain their decision in every
vote would allow a watchful public to evaluate each Justice’s
certiorari decisions over time and gain valuable insight into the true
motivations and criteria informing their votes. If this were true, it
could provide a powerful argument in favor of transparency in the
24. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 863 (1986).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss4/3

8

Virelli: Transparency and Policymaking

2016]

TRANSPARENCY AND POLICYMAKING

911

certiorari process. In reality, however, requiring the Justices to
explain all of their certiorari votes just compounds an already serious
problem of time and resource scarcity on the Court. The Justices’
explanations could take up a tremendous amount of the Court’s time
and energy, resulting (ironically) in even fewer cases being eligible
for review. Forcing Justices to go on the record in their certiorari
decisions also creates a body of individual precedent that will, if done
effectively, require Justices to make more and more nuanced
arguments in future cases in order to preserve the illusion of
consistency in a decision-making regime that is realistically destined
to be inconsistent. The more likely result would be a glut of cursory
statements about the resource and time constraints facing the
Justices.25
Second, requiring a Justice to explain their certiorari vote when
that vote was not part of a prevailing coalition could be perceived as
a conflict among the Justices over the value or importance of a
particular legal issue prior to the Court actually reaching a conclusion
on the topic. For example, six Justices may vote against hearing a
case on administrative grounds. A dissenting Justice’s explanation
that they voted to hear the case because of its substantive importance
could give the false impression that either the other Justices do not
think the case is substantively important, that their administrative
justification was a pretext, or both, when all that was really at work
was a disagreement among the Justices over the best use of the
Court’s docket that term. Prematurely signaling a dispute on the
Court over the substantive value of a given legal issue could
incentivize the Justices to rely exclusively on administrative
rationales for fear of raising issues that have not been fully vetted by
their colleagues. The resultant chilling effect could have negative
consequences for the Justices’ deliberations in future cases, thereby
ossifying, or at least complicating, the certiorari process without
much corresponding informational benefit to outside observers.26
25. See discussion infra note 35 and accompanying text.
26. One could argue that there is really no difference between a dispute about docket management
and the substantive importance of a case because the former will depend on the latter, and this may be
true in some cases. But when the institutional capacity to decide cases in a timely manner (less than 200)
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Both of these difficulties with increased transparency at the
certiorari stage are consistent with problems addressed in the
executive policymaking context by the deliberative process privilege.
Deliberative process protects against the “premature disclosure of
proposed policies . . . and . . . public confusion that might result from
disclosure of reasons and rationales that were not in fact ultimately
the grounds for an agency’s action.”27 Requiring Justices to explain
their certiorari votes risks forcing them to prematurely divulge
positions on policy issues before the entire Court has considered
them. It also threatens either to provide highly misleading
information about the Justices’ views on particular cases and issues
or to unfairly raise suspicions about the Justices’ candor when the
driving force behind a particular outcome is a genuine disagreement
about the Court’s short-term administrative priorities, rather than a
conflict over the substantive value of granting review.
In addition to purely administrative issues with certiorari, there are
more substantive considerations that may defy explanation and thus
counsel against transparency. The Court is constitutionally limited to
deciding “cases” and “controversies,” such that the substantive issues
raised by individual cases are not the only non-administrative
considerations in a certiorari decision.28 For an unreviewable body
like the Supreme Court, the danger of choosing the “wrong” case to
address a significant legal issue is especially salient. As Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes so aptly put it, “[g]reat cases, like hard cases,
make bad law.”29 Frederick Schauer similarly noted that lawmaking
through individual cases “may produce inferior law whenever the
concrete case is nonrepresentative of the full array of events that the
ensuing rule or principle will encompass.”30 This concern is
magnified at the Court and, as Justice Holmes indicated over a
century ago, is not lost on the Justices. Concerns about the factual or
is so far exceeded by the number of cases annually requesting review (over 7,000), there has to be room
for purely procedural line drawing in order to preserve the Court’s ability to function. See Frequently
Asked Questions, supra note 21.
27. DOJ GUIDE, supra note 9, at 13.
28. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
29. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
30. Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 884 (2006).
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procedural posture of a case may be grounds for the Court to pass on
that case despite the magnitude of the legal issue it raises. Imagine a
case that raises an issue of the utmost national interest but presents an
unusual factual scenario or one the Justices perceive to have been
decided below on an incomplete factual record. The Court could
decide to accept the case and remand it for further fact finding, but
could just as easily decide to deny review and wait for the issue to
come up again on a more fully developed record.31 The same is true
for potential procedural problems. Cases raising jurisdictional or
justiciability issues like standing may make it too difficult for the
Court to reach the real issue of interest, thus counseling the Justices
to deny review in that case and wait for one that raises the relevant
issue more directly.32 Highly sensitive social issues raise similar
certiorari problems. There are good arguments for the Court to
refrain from addressing a politically charged issue until the lower
courts and the political process have had a chance to confront it. This
is both to promote democratic values and for the simple reason that
Supreme Court decisions are far more difficult to change than
solutions from the lower courts or Congress.33

31. Similar concerns arose in a recently argued abortion case before the Court. See Dahlia Lithwick,
The
Women
Take
Over,
SLATE
(Mar.
2,
2016,
6:20
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2016/03/in_oral_arguments
_for_the_texas_abortion_case_the_three_female_justices.html (describing Justice Kennedy’s comment
during oral argument as indicating “that it might be ‘proper’ and ‘helpful’ for the court to remand this
back to the lower courts for hearings” on some perceived deficiencies in the factual record).
32. There is a case to be made that this is what happened in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013), a case that raised the issue of the constitutional right to marriage for same-sex couples but that
was ultimately decided on standing grounds.
33. This has come up recently in the Second Amendment context. Since its landmark decision in
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Court has denied certiorari in several Second
Amendment cases, presumably to let the lower courts and the political process deal with the
ramifications of Heller before the justices weigh in with another unreviewable ruling on the matter.
Jonathan Adler, Supreme Court Declines to Hear Second Amendment Case over Dissent of Two
Justices, WASH. POST (June 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2015/06/09/supreme-court-declines-to-hear-second-amendment-case-over-dissent-of-two-justices/
(“Since deciding D.C. v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago, the Court has shown little interest in
clarifying the scope of constitutionally protected gun rights.”); Protecting Strong Gun Laws: The
Supreme Court Leaves Lower Court Victories Untouched, LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE
(Aug. 26, 2015), http://smartgunlaws.org/protecting-strong-gun-laws-the-supreme-court-leaves-lowercourt-victories-untouched/ (explaining that since 2008, “the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected more than
sixty cases seeking to expand” Heller).
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Although these may be valid reasons to deny review, they do not
necessarily mean the Justices should not explain their vote against
granting certiorari on those grounds. After all, if the Court is
expected to explain itself in opinions deciding cases on factual or
procedural grounds, it should be able to do so in the certiorari
context. The difference between such explanations in merits versus
certiorari decisions, however, is two-fold. First, in merits cases, the
Court has presumably decided that the factual or procedural issue
requires an official resolution. In that case, an explanation is
important because it is part of the Court’s responsibility to decide
cases and set binding precedent. At the certiorari stage, the
explanation does not create any future legal consequences and is thus
less valuable for that reason alone.34 Second, a merits decision
addressing factual or procedural issues will almost always garner a
majority of the Court, thereby diminishing the likelihood of
confusion about the Court’s message.35 Certiorari votes and, by
extension, any explanation thereof are individualized. The Court may
not reach any form of consensus on factual or procedural concerns at
the certiorari stage. The lack of legal effect and the possibility of
conflicting messages trigger the same concerns about public
confusion that underlie deliberative process privilege without an
obvious countervailing benefit. To the extent certiorari decisions
reflect the Justices’ policy determinations about which cases to
review, the arguments for transparency in those determinations fall
short.

34. Individual Justices’ certiorari decisions could create a body of precedent for that Justice. For the
reasons articulated above, the possibility of individualized precedent in certiorari decisions creates its
own set of challenges that also argue against transparency.
35. In the October 2013 term, a search of the Supreme Court Database revealed that the Court issued
only three plurality opinions, opinions in which less than a majority of the Court signed onto the
primary opinion in the case. The October 2014 term included only one. THE SUPREME COURT
DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org/index.php (last visited June 2, 2016). This is consistent
with historical data on plurality opinions. According to James F. Spriggs II and David R. Stras,
“Historically, plurality decisions by the Supreme Court have been relatively rare: during the 145 Terms
between 1801 and 1955, the Supreme Court issued only 45 plurality decisions.” James F. Spriggs II and
David R. Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO. L.J. 515, 519 (2011). However, “during the 54
Terms from 1953 to 2006, the Supreme Court issued 195 plurality opinions, approximately 3.4% of the
5,711 total cases decided during the period.” Id.
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There are also serious practical problems with any legislative
attempt to require transparency in the Court’s certiorari process.
Because the Court is unreviewable and any violations of legislative
disclosure standards would be (at least directly) unenforceable, it will
be difficult to ensure that the Justices reveal any more about their
certiorari decisions than they would otherwise choose to, which
currently appears to be almost nothing.36 More likely, in the interest
of inter-branch comity, the Justices would provide some summary
explanation such as, “I conclude that the current case is not a good
candidate for review.” This level of explanation offers little if any
insight into the process and makes the Court look potentially even
more obstructionist than it does under the current, more secret
regime. Relying on historic reasons for not divulging or explaining
certiorari votes is far easier to defend than offering largely hollow
explanations in response to a request by a coequal branch of
government. What’s more, the Justices are free to—and in fact do—
explain their disagreement with the Court’s decision to grant
certiorari when they feel it is necessary.37 This makes information
about the process available in at least some circumstances without
triggering the problems associated with mandatory reporting.
Taken in connection with previous arguments against the Court
offering detailed explanations of its certiorari votes, legislative
transparency requirements seem increasingly difficult to justify. Such
requirements promise little in the way of valuable insight while
increasing the likelihood of public confusion about the process and
potentially casting the Court as unduly obstructionist in its refusal to
fully comply with an arguably misguided congressional mandate.
Lastly, some commentators, including Professor Segall, argue that
simply recording the Justices’ certiorari votes in each case increases
transparency in a useful way.38 On one hand, a simple record of the
36. Congress could always employ its other constitutional tools, such as appropriations or
investigations, to try and incentivize compliance with certiorari disclosure requirements, but each of
these methods is at best indirect enforcement mechanisms. See Louis J. Virelli III, Congress, the
Constitution, and Supreme Court Recusal, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1535, 1587–99 (2012).
37. See, e.g., Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 2799 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
38. See Segall supra note 1, at 829.
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certiorari votes in each case diminishes concerns about public
confusion and prematurely revealing the Court’s views on policy
issues because it says little about either. It is hard for observers to be
confused, the argument goes, if all that is given to them is an
accounting of how each Justice voted. It likewise does not
prematurely reveal any Court policy regarding a particular case or
legal issue because it says almost nothing about it, especially the
administrative challenges surrounding certiorari.
The counter argument, however, is even more powerful. Because a
list of votes cast says nothing about the multiple variables affecting
that certiorari decision—such as administrative issues, factual or
procedural problems, and social and cultural attitudes—it is at best
unhelpful and at worst highly misleading. Taken literally, a vote
count says nothing about why certiorari was granted or denied in a
given case. Any more ambitious attempts to gather information from
such an accounting are inherently misinformed. The result is an
increased potential for public confusion with no corresponding
increase in public awareness or insight.
A vote count is further unsatisfying because it incentivizes the
Justices to change their approach to voting in order to preserve the
status quo of secrecy in their deliberations. One obvious way in
which the Justices could protect themselves against a requirement
that they divulge their certiorari votes is for the Court to make those
votes anonymous. Anonymous ballots would strip the vote count of
most, if not all, of its informational value and would be entirely
within the Court’s purview, absent a legislative requirement to the
contrary. To the extent Congress tried to legislatively require the
Court to publish its votes, it would run into the same problems of
public confusion and damage to the Court’s reputation already
discussed.
There is much intuitive appeal to pulling back the curtain on the
Court’s certiorari process. The most direct way to do that may be to
have the members of the Court explain their decisions. What is
missing from this view, however, is an acknowledgement of the
nature of the Court’s decision to hear a case. Due both to Congress’s
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delegation to the Court of control over its own docket and to the
breadth and interrelatedness of the variables involved in the decision,
the certiorari process more closely approximates a policymaking
exercise by the Justices than a more traditional adjudicative one. This
does not mean that increased transparency in certiorari decisions is
necessarily a bad idea in all cases. It merely suggests that recasting
the certiorari process in policymaking terms reveals a new
perspective on transparency at the Court that implicates additional
rationales for protecting policy makers from disclosure. Rationales
include the importance of the deliberative process privilege, which
have been previously overlooked in this context and that affect our
broader understanding of certiorari and, as it turns out, recusal at the
Court.
II. RECUSAL
Recusal is the process by which a judge or Justice is excluded from
participating in an individual case.39 Unlike the certiorari process,
recusal is currently regulated directly by Congress in the form of a
federal recusal statute.40 The statute precludes federal judges,
including Supreme Court Justices, from participating in a variety of
cases that may present a conflict of interest that could hinder the
judge’s impartiality, such as having a personal financial interest in
the outcome or being related to one of the parties or lawyers in the
case.41 Recusal is also statutorily required “in any proceeding in
which [a judge’s] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”42
Judges and Justices decide their own recusal issues in the first
instance. Those decisions are generally subject to appellate review,

39. “Recusal” is used interchangeably to include both the terms “disqualification,” which
traditionally refers to involuntary removal of a judge from a case, and “recusal,” which has historically
referred to a judge’s voluntary decision to withdraw from a case. RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 4 (2d ed. 2007).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012).
41. See id.
42. Id. at § 455(a).
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except for members of the Court, who lack any superior tribunal to
hear an appeal from their recusal decisions.43
Based on the clear statutory language, the decision to recuse
appears a purely legal one. Judges or Justices simply apply the
statutory provisions to the facts of their case. For lower court judges,
this is generally true. For Supreme Court Justices, however, I have
argued that the decision to recuse has constitutional implications that
render it closer to a policy judgment than a traditional legal
analysis.44 To summarize, constitutional text, history, and structure
suggest that a Justice’s decision to recuse is part of the “judicial
power” granted to the Court under Article III. Any congressional
attempt to interfere with that decision by setting substantive recusal
standards must be based in an independent source of congressional
power under Article I, like the Necessary and Proper Clause.45 Yet
when viewed as a matter of constitutional structure, we see that
legislative recusal standards for the Justices run afoul of the Court’s
inherent power under Article III to decide cases properly before it. To
the extent a recusal statute threatens to recuse all nine Justices in a
single case (an outcome that both theoretically and historically is far
more likely than most realize), the statute interferes with the Court’s
power to decide that case and thus violates the separation of powers
and, more specifically, Article III.46
The constitutional infirmities with Supreme Court recusal
standards highlight the true nature of recusal at the Court. While the
Justices have many sources to draw on to inform the ethical analyses
associated with recusal, they are also obligated to protect their
constitutional mission by remaining available to resolve disputes,
even in cases where widespread recusal may be justified. The result
43. Lower court judges are also the initial factfinders and adjudicators of their own recusal status,
subject to traditional appellate review by a higher court under an abuse of discretion standard. FLAMM,
supra note 39, 5-8, 988.
44. See generally VIRELLI, supra note 4. I have argued that similar constitutional issues with recusal
arise in the lower federal courts and state supreme courts, but those arguments are beyond the scope of
the present discussion of transparency at the Court. See id. at 165-210.
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
46. See Virelli, The (Un)Constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards, supra note 23, at
1207–25.
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is a balance between ethical and institutional concerns that may move
beyond a traditional legal analysis to resemble something more akin
to the policy determinations required in certiorari decisions.47 Once
we recast Supreme Court recusal as, at least in part, a matter of
judicial discretion, we are able to see the full range of transparency
concerns that accompany any policy decision, including recusal at the
Court.
As with the certiorari process, recusal at the Court is based on a set
of variables that can be difficult to balance. Any resulting
explanation of that balance runs the risk of ranging between
unhelpful and unduly confusing to a lay audience, and may therefore
trigger the same type of protections found in the deliberative process
privilege. Even if we assume—as we often do in complicated legal
analyses—that Justices are capable of explaining difficult decisions
in a way that the public can accept as legitimate, there are additional
problems of the potential precedential effect of recusal decisions on
individual Justices and other members of the Court. Certiorari is a
policy-based decision that is made by the Court as a whole—
individual Justices contribute to the outcome by voting, but no single
Justice has the sole ability to set “precedent” for the Court by voting
to hear or reject a case. Supreme Court recusal, by contrast, is and
always has been an individual, unreviewable decision by a Justice of
their own fitness to participate in a given case.48 If required to
explain themselves in any detail, the individualized nature of the
decision would put a Justice in the unique position of potentially
setting a precedent for their colleagues in future cases without any
input or feedback from the rest of the Court.

47. In my previous work on recusal at the Court, I have suggested that the justices’ recusal decisions
are controlled, at least at the margins, by the Due Process Clause. See VIRELLI, supra note 4, at 120–64.
But even if we think of due process analyses as traditionally legal, there will still be a wide range of
recusal issues before the Court that require balancing ethical and constitutional questions yet will not go
as far as to implicate fundamental issues of due process. The important point at present is that because at
least a wide range of recusal decisions are committed to the justices as a matter of constitutional law (as
opposed to statutory law in the certiorari context), similar questions arise about how the nature of the
Court’s activity affects the need for transparency.
48. John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 612 (1947).
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There are two potentially troubling consequences that arise from
this reality, both of which counsel against the Justices explaining
their recusal decisions. One is that it puts a single Justice in a position
to set what amounts to a policy decision for the entire Court.
Regardless of how persuasive (or not) the recusal-as-policy argument
first seems, there is no question that Supreme Court recusal entails
independent, unreviewable decisions by single Justices that
necessarily incorporate a wide range of factors about which
reasonable minds can differ. Requiring Justices to go on the record in
defense of their recusal decisions puts undue pressure on future
Justices who may have different—but equally defensible—views as
to how to balance the institutional and ethical concerns that arise in a
given case. Moreover, the Justices have consistently shown, in over
225 years of recusal practice, that they consider recusal an
independent matter for each Justice, and as such will not do anything
to unduly influence their colleagues’ recusal decisions.49 The
practical effect of this position is that even if explanations were
statutorily required, the most likely outcome is that the Justices
would seek to avoid providing any justification that could be seen as
limiting a future recusal decision. Imagine statements like “Based on
my review of the relevant facts and ethical standards, it is not
necessary that I recuse myself from the case at hand.” This type of
explanation does not inform or educate the public about the basis for
a recusal decision, and is very hard to prohibit statutorily when the
decision itself is unreviewable.
A second potentially disturbing consequence is that if the Justices
were inclined to explain their recusal decisions fully and candidly,
the result could be increasing pressure from within the Court to be
overly cautious in recusal cases. Consider two well-respected
hypothetical Justices, both of whom take their ethical and
institutional obligations quite seriously, and who have very different
backgrounds and ideological reputations. A case arises involving an
49. See, e.g., Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter? Judicial Impartiality and the Supreme
Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606, 622 (2002) (noting that “the Justices encourage and protect
a fiercely independent approach to their recusal determinations”).
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employment dispute at a technology company in which a
conservative Justice with a reputation for favoring business interests
owns a life insurance policy that invests in small part in the tech
industry. Concerned that the public will construe her indirect
investments as biasing her in favor of the corporation, she recuses
herself and explains as much in writing. A year later, a similar case
confronts the Court, but this time a Justice with a reputation for being
staunchly pro-employee has the same type of indirect investment in
the corporate party. She is not inclined to recuse because she does not
believe (quite reasonably) that anyone would perceive her life
insurance policy as biasing her against the employees in the suit.
Nevertheless, due to her colleague’s decision from the prior term, she
feels as if failing to recuse will make her appear less ethical. She
recuses herself and the Court is forced to decide the case with an
even number of Justices, thus risking a tie vote and the possibility of
the Court being unable to issue a binding, precedential opinion in the
case, despite the fact that the recused Justice was completely capable
of rendering a fair and impartial judgment in the suit.
It may be that the above example does not seem terribly disturbing.
After all, an ethical “race to the top” cannot be all bad. An exercise of
caution in exchange for protecting the integrity and fairness of
judicial proceedings makes sense. The problem arises when the
institutional pressures to conform with or exceed the ethical criteria
set by other Justices overcomes the ability to balance ethical and
institutional interests as required by Article III. Even if the above
hypothetical came out correctly, there is no doubt that valid
institutional concerns about the Court’s ability to exercise its judicial
power were potentially subjugated in an effort to appear as ethical as
the other Justices, even when the circumstances of the two cases were
meaningfully different. This is true even if both Justices feel fully
competent to explain their participation without causing undue
confusion. No matter how compelling the reasoning, a decision to
participate in a case that is at odds with another Justice’s decision to
recuse in an earlier case will inevitably be met with suspicion. It is
not at all unreasonable to think that Justices faced with that dilemma
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would prefer to remain above even the imagined ethical fray. For this
reason, the Justices have consistently and vehemently defended their
independence over recusal matters, even with regard to one another.50
Justice Anthony Kennedy made the point recently when he testified
before Congress that he believes the Justices’ recusal decisions
“should never be discussed,” even with other members of the Court,
because “[t]hat’s almost like lobbying.”51 His answer echoed the
statements of several of his colleagues, who have explained that they
do not like to reveal the reasons for their recusal decisions because
they do not want the other Justices to feel pressure to recuse in the
same situation.52
A final concern about individual Justices setting recusal precedent
is the opportunity it could create for opportunistic recusal motions
from parties seeking to influence the composition of the Court.
Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer testified before Congress
regarding their concerns about such motions.53 Written explanations
for recusal decisions could incentivize parties to attempt to recuse
ostensibly unsympathetic Justices from their case. This could unfairly
damage the Court’s public reputation and could raise significant
administrative problems, as Justices will be required to spend

50. Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Senator Patrick Leahy, Jan. 26, 2004,
reprinted in From the Bag: Irrecusable and Unconfirmable, 7 GREEN BAG 2D 277, 280 (2004). Chief
Justice William Rehnquist responded to a letter from Senators Patrick Leahy and Joseph Lieberman
arguing that Justice Antonin Scalia should have recused himself from a case in which he had gone duckhunting just prior to the case with a named party, Vice President Dick Cheney. The case was Cheney v.
United States District Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004). The case was important due to the high-profile
people involved and because it marked one of the very few instances in which a Supreme Court justices
voluntarily revealed their reasons behind a decision not to recuse. In his letter to the senators, Chief
Justice Rehnquist reminded them “it has long been settled that each Justice must decide such a question
for himself.” Letter from Rehnquist to Leahy, supra. Perhaps most importantly, he defended Justice
Scalia’s decision on the grounds that there is “no precedent” for recusal in such a case, and that “any
suggestion by you [Senator Leahy] or Senator Lieberman as to why a Justice should recuse himself in a
pending case is ill considered.” Id. at 280.
51. The United States House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, Budget Hearing-The
Supreme Court of the United States, HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE (Mar. 23, 2015),
http://appropriations.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=394064.
52. Steven Lubet & Clare Diegel, Stonewalling, Leaks, and Counter-Leaks: SCOTUS Ethics in the
Wake of NFIB v. Sebelius, 47 VAL. U.L. REV. 883, 893 (2013).
53. Considering the Role of Judges Under the Constitution of the United States: Hearings Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 28 (2011).
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valuable time and energy responding to such opportunistic recusal
motions.
Outside of the recusal-as-precedent context, requiring Justices to
explain their recusal decisions raises further complications that must
be weighed against the benefits of increased transparency generally.
As an initial matter, such reforms are unenforceable against the
Justices and thus incentivize Justices who do not wish to reveal their
reasons to offer the same type of generalized, cursory statements that
are designed to prevent their explanations from becoming
precedential. Moreover, whatever benefit may be generated by the
Justices disclosing the reasons for their recusal decisions, much of
that benefit is lost in the absence of parallel substantive standards. If
a Justice is unrestrained by Congress in deciding when to recuse
herself, as I contend the Constitution requires, it is unlikely that the
procedural framework in which that decision was made will do much
to alter it. Published reasons for failing to recuse will not, in the
absence of defined criteria for recusal, promote public confidence
in the integrity of the Court because there will be no baseline
against which to measure the quality of the Justices’ explanations.54
One counter argument to this point about procedural requirements
being effectively hollow without corresponding substantive
guidelines is that a public account of a Justice’s recusal decision
could be used by the remaining members of the Court as a de facto
record against which to review that decision. Using recusal
explanations in this way would incentivize the Justices to be as
thorough in their justifications as lower court judges, and would
enable their colleagues on the Court to conduct a meaningful review
of their decision. There have been numerous calls for appellate-style
review of the Justices’ recusal decisions by the remainder of the
Court, and the idea has some intuitive appeal.55 When looked at more
closely, however, internal review of a Justice’s recusal decision is
rife with legal and logistical problems that make it, and in turn any
54. Virelli, The (Un)Constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards, supra note 23, at 1224.
55. See, e.g., The Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 862, 112th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 3(a)–(b) (2011), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h112-862; Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 644 (1987).
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argument for transparency based on it, untenable. Legally, it is
unlikely that some subset of the Justices could review the work of
one of their own without running afoul of Article III’s “one supreme
Court” requirement.56 Throughout the overwhelming majority of its
history, the Supreme Court has acted as a singular unit.57 It has not
been divided into panels like the circuit courts, and, as Chief Justice
John Roberts pointed out in his 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary, it would be unprecedented to allow members of the Court
to review a Justice’s recusal decision.58
As a practical matter, it is unlikely that the Justices would agree to
review one another’s decisions, and even if they did so it is almost
certain they would arrive at summary affirmances in every case. The
Court has consistently held the view that recusal is an independent
inquiry for each individual Justice.59 The Justices have supported that
stance by refraining from engaging in any public exchanges about
one another’s recusal decisions, save for one instance in which
Justice Robert Jackson publicly suggested that Justice Hugo Black
should have recused himself from the case of Jewell Ridge Coal
Corporation v. United Mine Workers of America.60 Justice Jackson’s
comments not only proved damaging to his own reputation, but also
drew enough negative attention to the Court that it caused concern
among the Justices about its effect on the integrity of the institution.61
56. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, An Open Discussion with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1033,
1039 (2004).
57. Ross E. Davies, The Reluctant Recusants: Two Parables of Supreme Judicial Disqualification,
10 GREEN BAG 2D 79, 92 (2006).
58. JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 8 (2011),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf (“A court normally does not
sit in judgment of one of its own members’ recusal decision in the course of deciding a case.”). Federal
judges may voluntarily submit their decisions for review by their peers on the court, but no court at any
level of the federal judiciary reviews the recusal decisions of its own members. In re United States, 158
F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998). Some states such as Alaska, California, Michigan, Oklahoma, and Texas
have adopted procedures whereby a judge’s decision not to recuse may be reviewed by the other
members of the same court. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 22.20.020(c) (West 2012); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
170.3(c)(5) (West 2012); MICH. CT. R. 2.003(D)(3)(b) (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, Ch. 2,
App. R. 15(b) (West 2012); TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(f)-(g) (West 2012).
59. See ROBERTS, supra note 58, at 7–8.
60. Jewel Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of America, 325 U.S. 161
(1945).
61. Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Black-Jackson Feud, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 221 (“Washington
was, of course, thunderstruck by Jackson’s blast. Newspaper columnists attacked both justices, although

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss4/3

22

Virelli: Transparency and Policymaking

2016]

TRANSPARENCY AND POLICYMAKING

925

In the seventy years since the Jewell Ridge incident, the Justices have
spoken only rarely about their recusal practices, and in every instance
have come out in support of their individual autonomy in recusal
matters.62
Even if the Justices were inclined to try and review one another’s
recusal decisions, the logistics of that review may prove too difficult.
As an initial matter, the Justices and the Court as a whole are poorly
equipped to develop a factual record needed for meaningful review.
As Professor Stempel explained, “[t]he Court . . . lacks any formal
rule, mechanism, or custom of permitting fact development in aid of
a recusal motion.”63 The unitary nature of the Court creates
additional problems. Imagine an instance where two or more Justices
faced recusal issues. How should the remaining members of the
Court be allocated to review those recusal decisions? Should all eight
of the remaining Justices review each recusal question, such that
some Justices facing recusal themselves are voting on the fitness of
their colleagues to participate in the same case? At what point does it
seem too self-serving for one Justice facing recusal to be deciding on
the potential participation of a colleague whom they may suspect
would cast a vote different from their own? More generally, even if
we assume (and there is no reason not to) that the Justices would only
act in good faith, the mere appearance of any of the Justices voting to
determine the composition of the Court in a specific case invites
skepticism that could be damaging to the Court’s reputation and, in
turn, legitimacy.
Finally, requiring the Justices to provide written explanations of
their recusal decisions adds additional work that could have serious
administrative costs for the Court. It is not hard to envision multiple
Justices being required to publish recusal decisions in nearly every
case, at considerable cost in judicial time and money and at the
expense of their work on merits cases. When compared to the limited

Jackson took most of the fire.”).
62. Ifill, supra note 49, at 622 (observing that “the Justices encourage and protect a fiercely
independent approach to their recusal determinations”).
63. Stempel, supra note 55, at 642.
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benefits of published recusal decisions, this alone is a powerful
argument against increased transparency in the recusal context.
The multifaceted nature of recusal at the Court makes it more akin
to executive policymaking than traditional adjudication. The result is
that it forces us to reexamine the Justices’ recusal practices—
especially the lack of transparency in those practices—in a new light.
Perhaps surprisingly, a more policy-oriented look at Supreme Court
recusal offers several powerful arguments against increased
transparency that may otherwise not be obvious at first glance.
CONCLUSION
Transparency is undoubtedly an important principle in a
democratic government. It is not, however, necessarily a one-sizefits-all proposition. This holds true for issues of transparency at the
Supreme Court. Whereas the Court’s traditional adjudicative
responsibilities fit comfortably within norms of transparent decision
making like publishing written opinions in merits cases, some of its
other, more policy-oriented roles do not. This short paper considers
two areas in which the Court’s activities more closely resemble
policy judgments than traditional adjudication—certiorari and
recusal—and uses them as examples of how the nature of the Court’s
activity can impact the value of transparency in that activity. It does
not seek to prove that transparency is per se less valuable in certiorari
and recusal decisions, but rather to highlight the highly discretionary
nature of those decisions and to propose that granting such a high
degree of latitude to the Court also triggers some of the protections,
like the deliberative process privilege, that are more commonly
associated with policymaking by administrative agencies. The result
is a call for a more context-based dialogue about transparency at the
Court in hopes of promoting both our democratic values and the
legitimacy of one of our most important institutions.
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